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Under certain circumstances the court may extend by a, reasonable time the sixty-day notice provision for infants and incapacitated
persons if such application is made within a year. 9
There is a provision to the effect that mistakes, omissions, irregularities or defects made in the notice of claim required to be
served, not pertaining to the manner or time of service, may be corrected, supplied or disregarded in the discretion of the court.
Section 50-e specifically provides that it shall not apply to claims
arising under the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Law,
nor to claims arising under Article Ten of the General Municipal
Law (regarding rights and privileges of firemen and policemen). The
Act became effective September 1, 1945 but was not to apply to
claims accruing before that date.
The, statute is a welcome step toward securing uniformity in
the preparation and presentation of tort claims against public corporations and gives promise of a more equitable administration of justice
in this field.

ROBERT E. vox ELTEN.
AMENDMENT TO THE INSURANcE LAW RELATING TO THE
RIGHTS OF JUDGMENT CREDITORS AGAINST LIABILITY INSURERS.Effective September 1, 1945, Section 167 of the New York Insurance
Law was amended by the addition of subsection seven.
Before the adoption of this amendment, that is, under Section
167 and its predecessor, Section 109, an action against the liability
insurer could be brought only by the injured person, or his personal
representative, who had recovered a judgment for damages against
his tort-feasor, the insured. The amendment gives this right of action, in addition to the injured person, or his personal representative,
to three other classes of judgment creditors: assignees, contribution
creditors and indemnity creditors.
Under the common law of New York an injured party had recourse only against the insured, his tort-feasor. He could have no
recourse against the liability insurer. If the insured was execution
proof, the injured person could collect nothing; the insured sustained
no pecuniary loss or damage and the insurer was under no duty to
pay. In 1917, to give the injured person an additional remedy, Section 109 was adopted.
This section provided that no policy of insurance against loss
or damage resulting from an accident or injury should be valid unless there was contained in the policy a provision that the insolvency
or bankruptcy of the person insured or the insolvency of his estate
9 The Judicial Council originally recommended "a reasonable time after
the disability ceases" while the compromise bill of 1944 provided for sb.
months.
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should not release the insurance carrier from the payment of damages
for injury and gave to "the injured person or his or her personal
representative" an action against the insurer, "in case judgment
against the insured or his or her personal representative in an action
brought by the injured person or his or her personal representatives,
to recover damages for injury sustained or loss occasioned during the
life of the policy shall remain unsatisfied at the expiration of thirty
days from the date of service of notice of judgment upon the attorney
for the insured and upon the insurer."
Section 109 was added to the Insurance Law of 1909 by Laws
of 1917, Chapter 524. In 1925 it was held constitutional by the
United States Supreme Court and not in violation of the Federal
Bankruptcy Laws.'
In Jackson v. Citizens Casualty Co. 2 it was held that the right of
action against the insurer under Section 109 was not transferable by
a voluntary assignment, hence that the assignee could not be substituted for the judgment plaintiff in an action to recover judgment
against the insurer. The court concluded that the statute was drawn
for the protection of injured plaintiffs 3 and that the specific mention
of the injured person or his or her personal representative as those4
to whom the right of action was given implied the exclusion of others.
The plaintiff argued that by Section 41 of the Personal Property
Law 5 final judgments, even for personal injuries, are assignable.
The court stated that Section 41 did not enlarge the class of persons
to whom the action was given. To the argument that the plaintiff's
cause of action against the insurer was a contractual right and therefore freely assignable, the court replied that the contractual provision was compulsory, and therefore gave no greater rights than the
statute.
The court did concede, however, that the legislature could enlarge these rights. 6
The case deals with a voluntary assignment of a judgment against
the insured. A judgment may be transferred involuntarily as by
bankruptcy or sale on execution, or ,by operation of law as in the case
of subrogation. The only New York cases which have dealt with
the rights of an involuntary transferee against the liability insurer
relate to subrogation. Under Section 29 of the Workmen's Compensation Law 7 (which was enacted substantially in its present form
prior to the enactment of former Section 109 of the Insurance Law),
' Merchants Mutual Automobile Liability Insurance Co. v. Smart, 267
U. S. 126, 69 L. ed. 538 (1925).
2277 N. Y. 385, 14 N. E. (2d) 446 (1938).
3 277 N. Y. at 390.
4 Ibid.
5 N. Y. CoNs. LAWS

(1909) c. 41.

6 277 N. Y. at 391.
7 N. Y. CoNs. LAWS § 29.
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an employer, having paid an award to its employee for injuries arising out of and in course of the employment, is entitled to maintain
an action against a third person who tortiously caused the employee's
injuries for which such award was made; and the same tight is
given to the insurance carrier of the employer, which is thus subrogated to the rights of its insured. Yet the New York courts have
held that the person who obtained such a judgment against the tortfeasor was not entitled to maintain an action against the tort-feasor's
liability insurer, pursuant to former Section 109 of the Insurance
Law.8 The reasons given in these cases are similar to those of
Jackson v. Citizens Casualty Co.," namely the restrictive language
I
of the statute and its supposed policy.
In 1939 the Insurance Law was amended, Section 109 becoming
Section 167. The language of former Section 109 was limited to an
action "by the injured person, or his or her personal representative"
against the insurer. In the corresponding provision of Section 167,
the phrase quoted is omitted. The present statute states merely that
"an action may be maintained" and does not expressly restrict the
class of persons who may maintain the action. This change in the
wording of unamended Section 167 which omits "by the injured
person" would seem to indicate a legislative intention to supersede
the restrictive interpretation of the case of Jackson v. Citizens Casualty Co.10 The decision in La Gumina v. Citizent Casualty Co. of
N. Y."1 indicated that a more specific statutory amendment would be
necessary if the restrictive interpretation was to be abrogated.
In this case the plaintiff and one Rabin had been sued as codefendants in a personal injury action by one Kaplan who recovered
a judgment for $1,000 and costs against both. In the same action
La Gumina, having paid the judgment in full, recovered a judgment
against Rabin for contribution. La Gumina then sought to recover
judgment for this amount against Rabin's liability insurer, the defendant here. The court pointed to precedents 12 holding that under
Section 109 of the former Insurance Law, the predecessor of present
s Royal Indemnity Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 244 App. Div. 582, 280
N. Y. Supp. 485 (lst Dep't 1935), aff'd, 270 N. Y. 574, 1 N. E. (2d) 337 (1936)
(memo. op.) (suit by employer's insurer); Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. New
York Indemnity Co., 140 Misc. 654, 251 N. Y. Supp. 526 (App. T. 1931)
(suit by employer); Franklin Surety Co. v. U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co.,
282 N. Y. 537, 24 N. E. (2d) 976 (1939) (no opinion), aff'g, 256 App. Div.
973, 11 N. Y. S. (2d) 247 (1st Dep't 1939) (no opinion) (suit by employer's
insurer).

9 Supra note 2.

20 Supra note 2.
11 180 Misc. 877, 44 N. Y. S. (2d) 534 (N. Y. City Ct. 1943), aff'd, 181
Misc. 180 (Sup. Ct 1944) (no opinion), motion for leave to appeal denied,
267 App. Div. 955, 48 N. Y. S. (2d) 471 (1st Dep't 1944).
12 Jackson v. Citizens Casualty Co., supra note 2; Royal Indemnity Co.
v. Travelers Ins. Co., supra note 8.
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Section 167, the right against the insurer was confined to "injured
plaintiffs" and hence did not include a joint tort-feasor seeking to
collect a judgment for contribution. The words "by the injured
person," which were in Section 109, and which were relied upon in the
precedents, were omitted from Section 167. Yet the court found
that a proposal to insert express language in Section 167 recognizing
the right to contribution failed of enactment by the legislature. The
court refused to give the statute an interpretation which the legislature had failed to enact. A motion to dismiss the complaint was
granted.
The right of indemnity which the law gives to one tort-feasor
against the other is based on the principle that the latter is, for some
reason appearing in the relations between the parties or the other
circumstances of the case, primarily liable for the entire loss and
hence will be unjustly enriched unless he is compelled to make full
reimbursement to the former who has paid the claim wholly or in
part. This right arises by operation of law and does not depend on
an express agreement to assume such liability. This right may arise
even though there be such an agreement.
In a recent New York case,' 8 the defendant Ford Motor Company contracted to inspect airplane equipment for the plaintiff. In
the course of its inspection the defendant failed to discover, or to
report the discovery of, machine tool marks on a certain part of a
plane which marks made it more likely to break. The part did break.
The resulting crash cost the plaintiff $90,000 including claims paid
for the death of passengers. Judgment was given for the plaintiff.
In another recent case the liability insurer of the indemnitee, having
paid the judgment obtained by the injured party, was held entitled
to recover judgment against the party priby way of subrogation
4
marily liable.'
The three New York cases, cited above,15 in which an employer
was denied recovery against the insurer of the tort-feasor who injured his employee in the course of his employment, indicate that a
common law indemnitee would be denied recovery, since the Workmen's Compensation Law, Section 29, in effect creates a statutory
right of indemnity. The employer is liable without regard to fault,
whereas the tort-feasor is ordinarily held liable only because of his
fault.
No New York cases have been found either granting or denying
the right of a common law indemnitee judgment creditor to recover
13 American Airways v. Ford Motor Co., 170 Misc. 721, 10 N. Y. S. (2d)
816 (Sup. Ct. 1939), aff'd as nmodified, 258 App. Div. 957, 17 N. Y. S. (2d)
998 (1st Dep't 1940), aff'd 284 N. Y. 807, 31 N. E. (2d) 925 (1940) (no
opinion).
14

Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Societe Coiffure, Inc., 50 N. Y. S. (2d) 40

(Sup. Ct 1944); John Wanamaker, New York, Inc. v. Otis Elevator Co.,
228 N. Y. 192, 126 N. E. 718 (1920).
15

Supra note 8.
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from the indemnitor's liability insurer. The reasoning of La Gumina
v. Citizens Casualty Co.,16 and of the New York cases construing
former Section 109, would lead to the conclusion that the indemnity
creditor would be denied recourse against the indemnity debtor's liability insurer.
Thus it is seen that since the less restrictive phrasing of Section
167 -did not lead to less restrictive interpretation, there was a need
for a more specific statutory amendment. Subsection seven gives
to the assignee, the contribution creditor, and the indemnitee creditor
the same right of action as is given to the injured party or his personal representative.
KENNETH Fox.
RIGHTS OF DEFENDANT DIRECTORS, OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES

TO REIMBURSEMENT FOR DEFENSE OF STOCKHOLDERS' DERIVATIVE
AcTION.-The New York Legislature at its last session enacted
Article 6a of the General Corporation Law.' The primary purpose
of this article is an attempt to eliminate the "benefit rule" as established by the courts in declaring the common law and
in interpreting
2
former Section 61a of the General Corporation Law.
At common law, the court, in New York Dock Co., Inc. v.
McColluin,s required a defendant director to show that some direct
benefit had accrued to the corporation before he would be allowed reimbursement for his successful defense of a stockholders' derivative
action. However, that this was paradoxical 4 was apparent and even
recognized by the McCollum case which established the "benefit rule",
since it is obvious that a corporation stands to gain only if the plaintiff stockholder is successful.
Soon after the McCollum case, and probably as a result, the
legislature enacted former Section 61a of the General Corporation
Law, presumably to remedy the effect of the McCollum case. However, in subsequently interpreting the two main divisions of Section
16

Supra note 11.

I N. Y. Laws 1945, c. 869, effective April 1945.
2 N. Y. Laws 1941, c. 350, § 1, effective April 1941, repealed L.

1945,

c. 869,
3 § 2.
New York Dock Co., Inc. v. McCollum, 173 Misc. 106, 16 N. Y. S. (2d)
844 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
In this case, former Court of Appeals Judge Crouch, sitting as official
referee, concluded that there is no legal or equitable right to reimbursement

for a director's successful defense of a stockholders' derivative action except

where a director can show that: "in conducting his own defense successfully,
he has conserved some substantial interest of the corporation which otherwise
might not have been conserved or has brought some definite benefit to the
corporation which otherwise might have been missed"; Bailey v. Bush Terminal, 293 N. Y. 735, 56 N. E. (2d) 739 (1944). Contra: Soliminie v. Hollander et al., 129 N. J. Eq. 264, 19A (2d) 344 (1941).
4 In the words of former Court of Appeals Judge Crouch: "Just how
such a state of facts can come about, however, is not very clear to the referee."

